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DRUNKENNESS AS AN EXCUSE FOR CRIME.
The Early English Commentators.-The principle that drunkenness can be set up in defence of the commission of a crime has
never been admitted into the English common law. "The law of
-England," says Blackstone, "considering h6w easy it is to
counterfeit that excuse, and how weak an excuse it is, though real,
will not suffer any man thus to privilege one crime by another:"
2 Black. Com. 25. In his History of the Pleas of the Crown, Sir
Matthew Hale says: "The third-sort of madness is that which
is dementia affectata, namely, drunkenness. This vice doth deprive men of the use of reason, and puts maay men in a perfect
but temporary frenzy; but by the laws of England such a person
shall have no privilege by this voluntarily contracted madness, but
shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses:"
p. 30. Hawkins, in his Pleas of the Crown, says: "That he who
is guilty of any crime whatever, through his voluntary drunkenness, shall be punished for it as much as if he had been sober."
Lord COKE, in his Commentaries, says: "As for a drunkard, who
is voluntarius dwmon, he hath no privilege thereby, but what
hurt or ill soever he doeth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it:"
247 a.
The Early English Cases.-In Reniger v. Pogossa, reported in
Plowden, p. 19, it is laid down, "that if a person that is drunk
kills another this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it;
and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he was drunk he
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had no understanding or memory; but inasmuch as that ignorance
was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have
avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby."
The same doctrine
was enunciated by Lord MANSFIELD, who said in the celebrated
case of the Chamberlain of London v. Evans, in the House of
Lords in February 1767, that "a man shall not be allowed to
plead that he was drunk, in bar of criminal prosecution, though,
perhaps, he was at the time as incapable of the exercise of reason
as if he had been insane; because his drunkenness was itself a
crime he shall not be allowed to excuse one crime by another."
The Modern English Cases.--In B. v. Burrow, decided in
1823 (1 Lew. 0. C. 75), the prisoner-was indicted for rape, and
urged that he was in liquor. HOLROYD, J., addressed the jury as
follows: "It is a maxim in the law if a man gets himself intoxicated, he is answerable to the consequences, and is not excusable
on account of any crime he may commit when infuriated by
liquor, provided he was previously in a fit state of reason to know
right from wrong. If, indeed, the infuriated state at which he
arrived should continue and become a lasting malady, then he is
not answerable." A similar charge was given to the jury in the
next case in the same book, where drunkenness was urged, upon
the trial of an iridistment for burglary. Patrick Carroll was tried
in 1835, at the Central Criminal Court, before a judge of the
King's Bench and a judge of the Common Plead, for the murder
of Elizabeth Browning.. It appeared that shortly before the homicide the prisoner was very drunk. His counsel, though he admitted that drunkenness could not excuse from the commission
of the crime, yet submitted that in a charge for murder, the material question being whether the act was premeditated or done with
only sudden heat and impulse, the fact bf the party being intoxicated was a proper circumstance to be taken into consideration,
and he referred to a case before HOLROYD, J., reported in 1 Russ.
on Crimes 12 (Rex v. Grindley), where that doctrine was laid
down. PARK, J., in summing up, said: "Highly as I respect
that late excellent judge, I differ with him, and my brother, LITTLEDALE, agrees with me. He once acted on that case, but
afterwards retracted his opinion, and there is no doubt that that
case is not law. I think that there would be no safety for human
life if it were considered as law." The prisoner was convicted and
executed: 7 0. & P. 145. And the same rulings were made by'
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B., in Rex v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. 297 (1836), and by
PATTESON,'J., in Beg. v. Cruse, 8 C. & P. 546 (1838).
The American Doctrine.-The same doctrine-that voluntary
drunkenness does not excuse a crime committed while in that
state-is reiterated in a multitude of American cases: State v.
Keath, 83 N. C. 626 (1880); Cornwell v. State, Mart. & Y. 147
(1827); State v. MecOants, 1 Spears 393 (1843); State v. Bullock,
13 Ala. 413 (1848); Tidwell v. State, 70 Id. 33 (1881); Cross v.
State, 55 Wis. 261 (1882); Priery v. People, 54 Barb. 319 (1865);
2 Keyes 424; People v. Robinson, 1 Park. 649 (1854); 2 Id.
235 (1855); State v. Thompsbn, 12 Nev. 140 (1877); Shannahan
v. Com., 8 Bush 464; State v. Turner, Wright 20 (1831); U. S.
v. MGlue, 1 Curt. C. C. 1 (1851); U. S. v. Drew, Baldw. 28
(1828); Boswell v. Com., 20 Gratt. 860 (1871); State v. Mullen,
14 La. Ann. 570 (1859); Rafferq v. People, 66 Ill. 118 (1872);
McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 335 (1870); People v. Williams, 43
Cal. 344 (1872); State v. Hurley, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 28 (1858);
Mercer v. State, 17 Ga. 146 (1854); Shannahan v. Com., 8
Bush 463; 8 Am. Rep. 465 (1871); Schaller v. State, 14 Mo.
502 (1851) ; State v. Barlow, 21 Id. 446 (1855) ; Peoplev. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334 (1882) State v. Grear,28 Minn. 426 (1881);
KYelly v. State, 3 S. & M. 518 (1844); Kenney v. People, 27 How.
Pr. 202; 18 Abb. Pr. 91; 31 N. Y. 330; O'Brien v. People, 48
Barb. 274 (1867).; People v. Bogers, 18 Id. 9 (1858); People v.
Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868); Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527; Bespublica v. Weidle, 2 Dall. 88 (1781); U. S. v. Claypool, 14 Fed.
Rep. 127 (1882); am. v. Hart,2 Brewst. 546 (1868); Com. v.
Dougherty,1 Browne 20, App. (1807); U. S. v. Forbes, Crabbe 559
(1845); Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray 463 (1855); State v. Bowen,
1 Iloust. Cr. Cas. 91 (1859); People v. Fuller,2 Park. 16 (1823);
Marshall v. State, 59 Ga. 154 (1877); -stes v. State, 55 Ga. 30
(1875). In People v. Willey, 2 Park. 19, tried in New York, in
1823, the prisoner was charged with perjury in swearing out a
warrant. His counsel offered to prove that he was intoxicated at
the time he came before the magistrate and obtained the warrant,
and stated that such a defence had been admitted by Chief Justice
SPENCER in a case of perjury. WALWORTH, Cir. Judge: "It is a
general rule in criminal prosecutions that the intoxication of the
accused is no defence and forms no excuse for the commission of a
crime. It .has been frequently so decided, even in the case of
ALDERSON,
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murder, though Judge VAN NEss once permitted the fact of intoxication to be proved to rebut the presumption of malice where a
man had been killed in a sudden affray, and to show that the act
was the effect of sudden passion and not of premeditation. But
the correctness of that decision has been much doubted. There
can be nothing in a case of bare-faced perjury like the present to
take it out of the general rule. There must be some mistake about
the case said to have been decided by Chief Justice SPENCER.
But even if he did so decide, it was contrary to the uniform decisions of courts in relation to such a defence and, therefore, cannot
be the law." The prisoner was convicted. In People v. Porter,
2 Park. 14, in the same staie, in 1823, the prisoner was indicted
in New York for blasphemy. His couns l offered to prove that he
was so beastly drunk that he did not know what he said. WALWORTH, J., "That is no excuse, and only aggravates the offence."
But there are three cases, which may be called the leading cases on
this topic, lioth on account of the frequency with which they have
been subsequently cited and the exhaustive discussion of the principle which they contain. These cases are Choice v. State, decided
in Georgia in 1860 ; Cornwell v..State, decided in Tennessee in
1827, and People v. Bogers, decided by the Court of Appes 9f
New York in 1858.
In Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424 (1860),,the prisoner having been
convicted of murder, it was urged in the Supreme Court that his
drunken condition at the time of the commission of the crime
should have been allowed to ext6nuate the offence. But Lump
C. J., said: "Whether any one is born with an irresistible desire
to drink, or whether such thirst may be the result of accidental
injury done to the brain, is a theory not yet satisfactoriy established. For myself I capitally doubt whether it ever can be.
And if it were, how far this crazy desire for liquor would excuse
from crime it is not for me to say. That this controlling thirst for
liquor may be acquired by the force of habit, until it becomes a
sort of second nature, in common language, I entertain no doubt.
Whether even a long course of indulgence will produce a pathological or organic change in the brain, I venture no opinion.
Upon this proposition however I plant myself immutably; and from
it'n6tbing can dislodge me but an act of the legislature, namely:
that neither moral nor legal responsibility can be avoided in that
way. This is'a new principle sought to be engrafted uponcriminal
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jurisprudence. It is neither more nor less than this, that a want
of will and "consoience to do right will constitute an excuse for the
commission of crime; and that, too, where this deficiency in will
and conscience is the result of a long and persevering course of
wrong doing. If this doctrine be true--I speak it with all seriousness-the Devil is the most irresponsible. being in the universe.
For, from his inveterate hostility to the Author of all good, no
other creature has less power than Satan to do right. The burglar
and the pirate may indulge in robbing and murder until it is as
hard for an Ethiopian to change his skin as for them to cease to
do evil; but the inability of Satan to control his will to do right is
far beyond that; and yet our faith assures us that the fate of Satan
is unalterably and eternally fixed in the prison-house of God's
enemies. The fact is, responsibility depends upon the possession
of will, not the power over it. Nor does the most desperate
drunkard lose the power to control his will, but he loses the desire
to control it. No matter how deep his degradation the drunkard
uses his will when he takes his cup. It is for the pleasure of the
relief of the draught that he takes it. His intellect, his appetite
and his will all work rationally, if not wisely, in his guilty indulgence, and were you to exonerate the inebriate from responsibility
you would do violence both to his consciousness and to his
conscience, for he not only feels the self-prompted use of every
rational power involved in accountability, but he feels, also, precisely what this new philosophy denies-his solemn and actual
wro'hg-doing in the very act of indulgence. Converse seriously
with the greatest drunkard this side of actual insanity, just compose him so as to reach his clear, constant experience, and he will
confess that he realizes the guilt, and therefore the responsibility
of his conduct. A creature made responsible by God never loses
his responsibility save by some sort of insanity. There have always
existed amongst men a variety of cases wherein the will of the
transgressor is universally admitted to have little or no power to
dictate a return to virtue. But mankind have never, in any age
of the world, exonerated the party from responsibility, .except when
they were considered to have lost rectitude of intellect by direct
mental aberration."
In Cornwell v. State, Mart. & Yerg. 147 (1827), the prisoner,
also accused and convicted of murder, urged in the Supreme Court
of Tennessee his intoxication as an excuse. CRABB, J., in deliv-
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ering the opinion of the court, said: "Three cases of conviction
for murder have been brought before this court at the present
term; in two of which, the prisoner was defended in the court
below, on the ground of madness Occasioned by drunkenness; and
yet in neither does it seem to us was there a colorable foundation
for such a defence. This court would be remiss in the performance
of their duty if they did not, under these circumstances, declare
the law explicitly on this most important subject. In the argument of these causes very untenable positions have been assumed,
and very dangerous doctrines have been advanced by counsel.
And from what was stated by some of those counsel, these doctrines
have been repeatedly urged, and sometimes sanctioned in the
courts below. It has become fashionable of late to discourse and
philosophize much on mental sanity and insanity. New theories
have been broached, and various grades and species of mania have
been indicated. Some reasoners have gone so far as to maintain
that we are all partial maniacs. Whatever differences of opinion
there may be as to the construction and operations of the mind
of man, whatever difficulty in discovering the various decrees
of unsoundness, it is only necessary for us to ascertain the kind of
prostration of intellect which is requisite to free a man from punishment for crime by the law of the land. It is with this alone
we have to do. What the law has said, we say. In all things
else we are silent. We put our feet in the tracks of our forefathers; No meus lij.sermo, aed qui pracepit Offellue. Let
us then for a moment resort to the sages of the law of different
ages, and learn from them whether that species of frenzy which is
produced by inebriety constitutes any excuse for crime, and what
sort of insanity it is which will serve this purpose?"
After reviewing the early English writers and judges on the
subject the court concluded: "In the above extracts we see
the law in this respect. A contrary doctrine ought to be
frowned out of circulation, if it has obtained it, by every friend
of virtue, peace, quietness and good government. The history
of criminals and criminal trials shows that he who has not
learned betimes to restrain the evil inclinations of our natureenvy, malice, revenge, and their kindred passions-but has a
sufficiency of moral sense left to deter him from the commission of
enormity while sober, will often ' screw his courage to the stickingpoint' by the free use of ardent spirits, and thus made able to
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silence the twinges of his conscience, will voluntarily imitate the
dmmon. But let courts once approve the doctrine now contended
for, and it will not be resorted to as a plea by persons of this
description alone; but even the cold-blooded, calculating assassin
will never be a sober homicide; he will always exhibit himself at
the bar of a court of justice as a specimen of insanity produced by
And thus this degrading and disgraceful, yet too
drunkenness.
common vice, instead of being hunted from society as the bane of
good morals and social and domestic happiness, will be converted
into a shield to protect from punishment the worst of crimes. All
civilized governments must punish the culprit who relies on so untenable a defence; and in doing so they preach a louder lesson of
morality to all those who are addicted to intoxication, and to
parents, and to guardians, and to youth, and to society, than
'comes in the cold abstract from pulpits.'
"1In order to be clearly understood we have supposed the strongest
case,-a case of entire prostration of intellect immediately occasioned by drunkenness, and have said that that constitutes no excuse. Instances, however, of henious offences, committed under
such circumstances, are believed to be of rare occurrence. They
are much oftener the result of that midway state of intoxication
which, although sufficient to stimulate the evil-disposed to actions
correspondent With their feelings, would not excite the good man
to criminal deeds. It is generally the drunken man acting out the
sober man's intent. He says and does when drunk what he thinks
when sober."
In People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9 (1858), the prisoner was convicted of a murder committed while intoxicated. On the trial his
counsel requested the court to charge that if it appeared by the
evidence that the condition of the prisoner from intoxication was
such as to show that there was no intention or motive, by reason
of drunkenness, to commit the crime of murder, that the jury
should find a verdict of manslaughter. But the court refused to
instruct the jury in the words of the proposition, but charged that
under the old law intoxication was an aggravation of crime; but
that intoxication never excused crime unless it was of the degree
to deprive the offender of his reasoning faculties. On appeal to the
Supreme Court this was declared error and the conviction reversed.
The case then went to the Court of Appeals. There the ruling of
the trial court was affirmed. "The principle," said DENIo, J., "that
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drunkenness shall not excuse crime, is absolutely essential to the
protection of life and property. In the forum of conscience there
is no doubt considerable difference between a murder deliberately
planned and executed by a person of unclouded intellect, and the
reckless taking of life by one infuriated by intoxication ; but human
laws are based upon considerations of policy, and look rather to the
maintenance of personal security and social order, than to an
accurate discrimination as to the moral qualities of individual conduct. But there is, in truth, no injustice in holding a person
responsible for his acts committed in a state of voluntary intoxication. It is a duty which every one owes to his fellow men and to
society, to say nothing of more solemn ,obligations to preserve, so
far as it lies in his own power, the inestimable gift of reason. If
it is perverted or destroyed by fixed disease, though brought on by
his own vices, the law holds him not accountable. But if by a
voluntary act he temporarily casts off the restraints of reason and
conscience, no wrong is done him if.he is considered answerable for
any injury which in that state he may do to others or to society.
*' * * Assuming the foregoing positions to be established, I proceed to an examination of the exceptions to the charge of the judge.
It is difficult to know precisely what was meant .by the request to
charge; but .I think its sense may be expressed thus--that druikenness might exist to such a degree that neither an intention to
commit murder, nor a motive for such an act, could be imputed to
the prisoner. It was, therefore, asked that it should be left ,to the
jury to determine whether such a degree of intoxication had been
shown, and that they .should be instructed that if it had, the
prisoner should be found guilty of manslaughter only. We must
lay out of view, as inapplicable, the case of a person who had become
insensible from intoxication, and was performing an act unaccompanied by volition. There was nothing in the evidence to show
that the prisoner's conduct was not entirely under the control of
his will, or which would render it possible for the jury to find that
he did not intend to stab the deceased with his knife. The mind
and will were no doubt more or less perverted by intoxication, but
there was no evidence tending to show that they were annihilated
or suspended. Assuming, therefore, that the request did not refer
to such. a hypothesis, the only other possible meaning is, that it
supposes that the jury might legally find that the prisoner was so
much intoxicated that he could not be guilty of murder, for the
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-want of the requisite intention and motive ; and the request was
that they uiight be so instructed. This would be precisely the
same thing as advising them that they might acquit of murder on
account of the prisoner's intoxication, if they thought it sufficient
in degree. It has been shown that this would be opposed to a well
established principle of lawi The judge was not at liberty so to
charge, and the exception to his refusal cannot be sustained. What
he did charge on the subject of intoxication was more favorable to
the prisoner than he had a right to claim. It implies that if he
was so far intoxicated as to be deprived of his reasoning faculties,
it was an excuse for the crime of murder; or, as perhaps it was
intended to state, that he could not be guilty of murder. The rule
which I have endeavored to explain, assumes that one may be convicted of murder or any other crime, though his mind be reduced
by drunkenness to a condition which would have called for an
acquittal, if the obliquity of mind had arisen from any other cause.
The judge ought to have charged that if a man makes, himself
voluntarily drunk, that is no excuse for any crime he may commit
while he is so, and that he must take the consequences of his own
voluntary act: Rex v. Thomas, supra. The charge, therefore,
gave the prisoner the chance of an acquittal, to .which he was not
entitled; but this was not an error of which he can take advantage."
Not now considered an Aggravaio.-The old English writers
regarded drunkenness as an agg-favation of the crime; and there
are expressions in some American cases to the same effect: Cor.
v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546; U. S. vv..Forbe8, Crabbe 559; U. S. v.
Claypool, 14 Fed. Rep. 127. But this is not strictly correct. In
McIntyre v. People, 88 Ill. 515, the court had told the jury that
"drunkenness is no excuse for crime, but rather -an aggravation
of it." On appeal this was held erroneous. "We are aware,"
said the court, "that text writers frequently say that drunkenness
is no excuse for crime, but rather an aggravation of the offence.
That it is no excuse is certainly true, but that it should be held in
law to aggravate crime is not, we conceive, a correct proposition.
In ethics it is no doubt true, but how it can aggravate a wilful,
deliberate murder, perpetrated with malice preconceived, and deliberately perpetrated, we are unable to comprehend. Or, that it
will aggravate what in law is only manslaughter, if perpetrated by
a sober man, into murder if committed by a drunken man, is not,
we conceive, true. Or that it increases a minor offence to one of a
VOL. XXXII.-29

226

DRUNKENNESS AS AN EXCUSE FOR CRIME.

higher grade is not true. Whilst it is not ground for reversing a
judgment, it is, perhaps, calculated to prejudice the defendant's
case, and a court might well omit to give it, or at least to modify
it before it should be given." In Terrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503, a
similar instruction was given by the trial court. In the Court of
Appeals it was said: "The court told the jury that the condition
of the defendant at the time of.the homicide, the result of intoxication, was an aggravation of the offence, and should be regarded by
the jury-thus in effect telling them if the defendant was intoxicated he might properly be convicted of a higher grade of offence
than the facts otherwise required ; for it will be observed it is the
offence and not its penalty which the court -tells the jury is aggravated by appellant's intoxication. It is needless for us to say that
the law of this state gives no warrant for any such doctrine.
While intoxication is certainly no excuse, much less justification,
for crime, it is a startling idea that the bare fact of one being in
this condition when the homicide is committed converts murder
in the second into murder in the first degree, or will authorize, if
not require, the jury to impose the penalty of death or confinement
for life instead of a term of years. This would be directly the
reverse of the rule laid down by the code, and would make the fact
that the homicide was committed when the perpetrator was incapable of a deliberate intention and formed design to take life or do
other serious bodily injury, for want of a sedate mind, an aggravation instead of a mitigatiqn of the heinousness of the offence."
MTke Exceptions to the General'_ule.-Tothe general principle,
which it has been seen is so well established, that voluntary drunkenness cannot excuse ok palliate a crime, and evidence that the
prisoner was intoxicated at the time is, therefore, irrelevant, there
are several exceptions which may be conveniently grouped under
eight heads, viz.:
(a) Insanityproduced by Intoxication.

(b) Premeditationand Deliberation.
(c) lIntent.
(d) Knowledge.
(e) Threats.
(f) Provocation.

(g) Self-Defence.
(h) Involuntary Intoxication.
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(a) Insanity produced by Intoxication.-Where the habit of
intoxication; tho igh voluntary, has been so long continued as to
produce disease which has so destrpyed the mental faculties of the
accused as to render him insane-make him unable to distinguish
between the right and wrong of the act he does-he is as much
excusable as though his insanity was the result of an involuntary
disease: Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435 (1878); Bradley v. State,
31 Id. 492 (1869); Cluck v. State, 40 Id. 263 (1872); Carter v.
State, 12 Tex. 500; Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149 (1873); O'Brien
v. People, 48 Barb. 274 (1867); -Erwin v. State, 10 Tex. App.
700 (1881); State v. Dillahunt, 3 Harr. (Del.) 551 (1840);
State v. Hurley, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 28 (1858); State v. Till, Id.
233 (1867) ; Afaconnehey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77 (1855) ; U. S. v.
Clarke, 2 Cranch C. C. 158 (1818); Golliher v. Cor., 2 Duv. 163
(1865); State v. Meaonigal, 5 Harr. 510; Beal v. People, 42
N. Y. 270 (1870); Schlenoker v. State, 9 Neb. 241 (1879);
Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422 (1866); Boswell's Case, 20 Gratt.
860 (1871). Even in England where the general principle is
adhered to so strictly this exception is recognised. In B. v. Burrow, Lewin 75, tried at the York assizes of 1823, the prisoner
being indicted for rape urged that he was drunk. HOLROYD, J.,
charged the jury as follows: "It is a maxim of law that if a man
gets himself intoxicated, he is liable to the consequences, and is
not excusable on account of any crime he may commit when infuriated with liquor, provided he was previously in a fit 'state of
reason to know right from wrong. If, indeed, the infuriated state
at which he arrives 'should continue and become a lasting malady,
then be is not amenable." In Bennie's Case, Lewin 76 (1825),
the prisoner was indicted for burglary, and urged in mitigation that
he was drunk. HOLROYD, J., to the jury: "Drunkenness is not
insanity, nor does it answer to what is termed an unsound mind,
unless the derangement which it causes becomes fixed and continued by the drunkenness being habitual, and thereby rendefing
the party incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.",
And see B. v. Dixon, 11 Cox 41; B. v. Leigh, 4 F. & F. 915. In
this country the case of United States v. Drew, 5 Mason 28, is
regarded as the leading authority upon this exception. The prisoner was tried before Mr. Justice STORY, in the United States
Circuit Court for the district of Massachusetts, in 1828, for the
murder of one Clark, while on board the ship John Jay, of which
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Drew was master and Clark second mate. At the trial the principal facts were not contested, but the defence set up was the
insanity of the prisoner at the time of committing the homicide.
It appeared, that for a considerable time before the fatal act, Drew
had been in the habit of indulging himself in very gross and almost
continual drunkenness; that about five days before it took place,
he ordered all the liquor on board to be thrown overboard, which
was accordingly done. He soon afterwards began to betray great
restlessness, uneasiness, fretfulness and irritability; expressed his
fears that the crew intended to murder him, and complained of
persons, who were unseen, talking to him and urging him to kill
Clark, and his dread of so doing. He Vould not sleep, but was in
almost constant motion during the day and night. The night before
the act he was more restless than usual, seemed to be in great fear,
and said that whenever he laid down there were persons threatening
to kill him if he did not kill the mate, etc., etc.- In short, he
exhibited all the marked symptoms of the disease brought on by
intemperance called delirium tremens. Upon the closing of the
evidence the court asked Blake, the district attorney, if he expected
to change the posture of the case. He admitted, that unless upon
the facts, the court were of opinion that this insanity, brougkt on
by the antecedent drunkenness, constituted no defence for the act,
he could not expect success in the prosecution.
Mr. Justice STORY instructed the jury to acquit. f"We are of
opinion," said he, "that -the indictment upon these admitted facts
cannot be maintained. The prisoner was unquestionably insane at
the time of committing the offence. And the question made at the,
bar is, whether insanity, whose remote cause is habitual drunkenness, is, or is not, an excuse in a court of law for a homicide committed by the party, while so insane, but not at the time intoxicated or under the influence of liquor. We are clearly of opinion
that insanity is a competent exQuse in such a case. In general,
insanity is an excuse for the commission of every crime, because
the party has not the possession of that reason which includes
responsibility. An exception is, when the crime is committed by a
party while in a fit of intoxication, the law not permitting a man
to avail himself of the excuse of his own gross vice and misconduct,
to shelter himself from the legal consequences of such crime. But
the crime must take place and be the immediate result of the fit of
intoxication, and while it lasts ; and not, as in this case, a remote
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consequence, superinduced by the antecedent exhaustion of the
party, arising from gross and habitual drunkenness. However
criminal in a moral point of view such an indulgence is, and however justly a party may be responsible for his acts arising from it
to Almighty God, human tribunals are generally restricted from
punishing them since they are not the acts of a reasonable being.
Had the crime been committed while Drew was in a fit of intoxication, he would have been liable to have been convicted of murder.
As he was not then intoxicated, but merely insane from an abstinence from liquor, he cannot be pronounced guilty of the offence.
The law looks to the immediate, and not to the remote cause; to
the actual state of the party, and not to the causes which remotely
produced it. Many species of insanity arise remotely from what,
in a moral view, is a criminil neglect cr fault of the party, as from
religious melancholy, undue exposure, extravagant pride, ambition,
etc. Yet such insanity has always been deemed a sufficient excuse
for any crime done under its influence."
(b) .Premeditatior and Deliberation.-The second exception is
that where the crime of murder is by statute divided into degrees,
the higher degree requiring proof of deliberation and premeditation, evidence of intoxication is admissible upon the question
whether the act was committed with deliberation or premeditation,
or both. In Swan v. State, 4 Humph. 136 (1848), the trial court
was asked to charge as a matter.of law that drunkenness would
reduce the crime of murder in the first degree to that of murder
in the second degree. The court in reply said that drunkenness
was-no excuse or justification for crime. In the Supreme Court,
on appeal, it was said: "The legal correctness of the general
statement of the court is abundantly sustained by a long and
unbroken series of authority in ancient and modern times, and by
none more strongly and fully than by this court in the case referred
to in Martin & Yerger's reports. Whatever ethical philosophy
may make of the matter, such, probably, for stern reasons of
policy and necessity, will ever remain the doctrine of criminal
courts. But, although drunkenness, in point of law, constitutes
no excuse or justification for crime, still, when the nature and
essence of a crime is made by law to depend upon the peculiar
state and-condition of the criminal's mind at the time, and with
reference to the act done, drunkenness, as a matter of fact affecting such state and condition of the mind, is a proper subject for
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consideration and inquiry by the jury. The question in such case
is, what is the mental status ?- Is it one of self-possession, favorable to the formation of fixed purpose by deliberation and premeditation, or did the act spring from existing passion, excited by inadequate provocation, acting, it may be, on a peculiar temperament,
or upon one already excited by ardent spirits. In such case it
matters not that the provocation was inadequate, or the spirits
voluntarily drank ; the question is, did the act proceed from sudden
passion, or from deliberation and premeditation ? What was the
mental status at the time of the act and with reference to the act ?
"To regard the fact of intoxication as meriting consideration in
such a case is not to hold that drunkenness will excuse crime, but
to inquire whether the very crime' vhich the law defines and
punishes has, in point of fact, been committed. If the mental
state required by law to constitute the crime be one of deliberation
and premeditation, and drunkenness or other cause excludes the
existence of such mental state, then the crime is not excused by
drunkenness or such other cause, but has not, in fact, been committed." And this doctrine has been endorsed in several subsequent cases in Tennessee: Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. 663 (1849) ;
Haile v. State, 11 Id. 156 (1850); Cartwright v. State, 8 Lea
376 (1881); Lancaster v. State, 2 Id. 576 (1879). The-same
doctrine has been announced in Connecticut in two recent cases :
State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 186 (1873) ; State v. Johnson, 41 Id.
585 (1874); and similqr rulings are to be found in other states:
Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594 (1860); iopt v. People, 104 U. S.
631; People v. Lewis, 86 Cal. 531 (1869) ; People v. Nichol, 84
Id. 212 (1867); People v. King, 27 Id. 507 (1865); People v,.
Williams, 43 Id. 344 (1872); People v. Belencia, 21 Id: 544
(1863); Curry v. Corn., 2 Bush 67 (1867); Kelly v. Corn., 1
Grant Cas. 484 (1858); Keenan v. Com., 44 Penn. St. 55 (1862);
Jones v. Com., 75 Id. 403 (1874); Colbath v. RState, 2 Texas
(App.) 391 (1877); People v. Odell, 1 Dakota 197 (1875); Lanergan v. People, 6 Park. 209; 50 Barb. 266 (1867); People v.
Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392 (1875). Of these cases Jones v. State,
29 Ga. 594, contains an exhaustive argument in favor of allowing
evidence of intoxication to be shown, not to excuse the crime but
to show that it was not committed at all. "One side in the argument," says the court in this casd, "affirms as a great principle,
that no man, drunk or sober, should be punished for a crime which
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he did not have sufficient mind to perpetrate ; and the other replies, with An equally important principle, that drunkenness is no
excuse for crimb. The two sides each relying upon its chosen
principle, have arrived at singularly conflicting conclusions. The
truth is, that both these principles are correct and constitute, with
the just deductions from them, but parts of an harmonious whole,
sustained by law and sanctioned by reason; * * * one is this:
Drunkenness is no excuse for crime; therefore, drunkenness
cannot be used for any purpose of defence in a criminal accusation, a non 8equitur, if ever there was one.

Ignorance. of

chemistry is no more an excuse for crime than drunkenness;
therefore, if the reasoning be good, ignorance of chemistry cannot
be used for any purpose of defence in a criminal accusation. If
Dr. Webster, on his celebrated trial at Boston, some years ago, for
the murder of Dr. Parkman, could have shown that he was ignorant of chemistry, he could have shown conclusively, not that he
had an excuse for the murder but that he did not commit it;
for the slayer, whoever he was, had carried the dead body through
a process of destruction involving high chemical knowledge. No
doubt the court would have allowed him to save his life by proving
his ignorance of chemistry, although ignorance of chemistry was"
no excuse for crime. Suppose now, the doctor could have proved
that he had been drunk to the point of stupor or mania potu during
the time when that chemical process must have been performed.
No doubt the court would have allowed him to do so-not to excuse,
mitigate or extenuate his crime, but simply to show in a very satisfactory way that he had not committed the crime; for it is exceedingly improbable that a man in that degree of drunkenness could
have conducted the chemical process, and Dr. Webster would have
been allowed, to save his life by proving that he was drunk. Some
years ago I knew an attempt at house-burning, where the slowmatch, found after the fire had been extinguished, exhibited great
ingenuity in the bending of wires and crooking of pins in a peculiar
way, so as to secure both slowness and certainty of ignition. The
crooking of the pins, especially, in a manner so peculiarly adapted
to the end in view, was the theme of village wonder for weeks afterwards, and is still remembered by many persons as a remarkable
display of mechanical genius. Now there were two or three men
who frequented that village in those days, any one of whom, if
suspicion had fallen on him, could have proved that at any time for
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a week before the fire, he had been too drunk to crook a pin.
Would any man have discarded that evidence if he had been seeking for the truth? Both these illustrations show the absurdity of
excluding the consideration of drunkenness in investigating the act
which enters into the alleged crime; but another fbrm of the fallacy
is, that when the act appears to have been done by the accused, he
shall not be allowed to excuse his act by any consideration of his
drunkenness. It might be sufficient to reply to this by saying, the
law says, that for crimes, not acts, drunkenness shall be no excuse.
This form of the fallacy ignores utterly the mosi important element
of the crime; for the mental part of the crime is criminal in morals
and religion, without its union with any act whatever, while neither
in law or morals has the act any criminality whatever until connected with a criminal state of mind. Adts need no excuse, crimes
do. This form of the fallacy put a drunken man not on the same
platform with sober men but on a much more disadvantageous one.
The act when done by appropriate means carries a presumption
against all men, sober or drunk, that it was intended to be done;
but this proposition is to leave it but a presumption against sober
men and to fix it irrevocably against a drunken man. The proposition admits that drunkenness, like any other 'no excuse' for
crime, may be used to throw light on the investigation into -the
physical constituent of the crime, but denies that it may be used
in examining into the mind, which is the special field where drunk-,
enness displays its power; that is to say, it may be used in that
part of the investigation on which it ordinarily throws least light;.
but must be excluded from that branch on which it usually throws
most light. Cani ther be a sensible reason for such a discrimina.
tion between the purposes for which drunkenness may be used? It
is too apparent to need argument that when the act is shown the
mental constituent of the crime still remains to be investigated,
and in this investigation there can be no rational discrimination
made between the light which may be shed upon it by drunkenness,
and that which may be shed by any other fact in the world. Let
me illustrate this branch of the investigation: The fact of being a
skilful physician is no more an excuse for crime than drunkenness is, and, therefore, if the reasoning in the last form of the fallady be good the fact of being a skilful physician ought not to be
used for the purpose of showing with what intention an act was
done. A man indicts another for an attempt to poison him, and
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proves that the accused actually administered arsenic to him. Here
the act is done, and the sole question is as to the intent with which
it was done. The accused simply shows that he was a skilful physician, and this single fact, in connection with the other fact that
the man did not die but got well, explains the whole case and.
shows that the act was done with an innocent and praiseworthy
intention; for if a skilful physician should intend to kill by arsenic
he would infallibly regulate the dose to kill and not to cure. And
here the man is permitted 'to excuse' his act in the language of
the fallacy by proving his own superior knowledge, a fact which
of all others is surely the last which ought to be allowed to excuse
any crime. Is it not plain that he does not use the fact ' to excuse
his act" but simply to show that the act was an innocent one which
needed no excuse ? Shall not drunkenness be used for the same
purpose when it can shed the same light? A skilful marksman
shoots at a bird at a short distance, but misses the bird and kills a
man who was behind the bush, and who turns out to be one with
whom the marksman had a deadly feud. He is indicted for murder.
The fact that a man so skilful with his gun should have missed the
bird at so short a distance, and should have hit his enemy, makes
a strong impression that the shooting at the bird was but a pretence to cover the real intention to slay his enemy. But the man
shows that he was very drunk, a fact which renders it at once very
probable that he should have missed the bird, and very improbable
that he had sufficient capacity for so &ep an artifice as the one
imputed to him, for drunken men are much more apt to be the vic
tims than the perpetrators of tricks. Is there in the world an
enlightened Christian or a barbarian who will say that this man
ought not to be allowed to save his life by proving that he was
drunk ? 'The fact has no effect to excuse his crime nor to excuse
his act, but to show that his act, though an unfortunate one, was
innocent and needed no excuse; or else to show that it was not an
act of murder but an act of involuntary manslaughter, in the pursuit of a lawful intent without due caution and circumspection.
On the question of murder, his drunkenness is in his favor, but on
the question of carelessness in the pursuit of his lawful intent, it is
against him, for carelessness is much more easily believed of a
drunken man than of a sober man. His drunkenness saves him
from the one charge and convicts him, perhaps, of the other, not
VoL. XXXII.-30
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by excusing the one crime, nor aggravating the other, bfit simply
by shedding the light of truth upon both."
In other states again, evidence of drunkenness to grade a crime
is not received. In Missouri the decisions are uniform in refusing
to make this exception to the general rule. It is said in that state:
"However differently the question may have been elsewhere determined, we are not disposed to overthrow the rule thus established
in this state, believing it to rest upon reason and authority, and
that any departure from it would neither be in the interest of a
higher civilization nor promotive of the best interests of society,
nor conducive to the ends of justice :" State v. Bdward8, 71 Mo.
324 (1879), citing State v. Hfarlow, 2]. Id. 446; State v. Gross,
27 Id. 332; State v. Hundley, 46 Id. 416; State v. Dearing, 65
Id. 530. Therefore drunkenness will not repel any inference of
malice and premeditation arising from- other facts in the case or
mitigate the offence to a crime of a less degree: State v. Dearing,

65 Mo. 580 (1877).
In Vermont it has been held that where a murder is done by
some kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, other than
by means of poison or lying in wait, the degree of the offence is
not lessened by proof that at the time it was committed the. prisoner was intoxicated any more than it would be if it bad been perpetrated by means of poison or by lying in wait: State v. Tatro,
50 Vt. 483 (1878). This case is noticeable for a very forcible
criticism of the reasons'and ruling in State v. John8on. Said the
court, per REDFIELD, J., "In the base of the State v. Johnson,
50 Conn. 186, the court held that intoxicatiQn, as tending to show
that the prisoner was incapable of deliberation, might be given in
evidence. Chief Justice SEYMOUR dissented, and FOSTER, J., who
tried the case below, did not sit, so that the four judges constituting
the court, were in fact, equally divided. The same case came
before that court again in 41 Conn. 584, and the opinion was
delivered by the same judge. The court were hard pressed with
the former opinion in the same case, and that it had taken a
departure from the common law. But the court repelled the intimation and declared that 'we have enunciated no such doctrine,'
but held ' on a trial for murder in the first degree, which, under our
statute requires actual express malice, the jury might and should
take into consideration the fact of intoxication, as tending to show
that such malice did not exist.' And in the same opinion the
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judge says: 'Malice may be implied from the circumstances of
the homicide: If a drunken man takes the life of another, unaccompanied with circumstances of provocation or justification, the
jury will be warranted in finding the existence of malice, though no
express malice is proved. Intoxication which is itself a crime
against society, combines with the act of killing, and the evil intefit
to take life which necessarily accompanies it, and all together afford
sufficient grounds for implying malice. Intoxication, therefore, so
far from disproving malice, is itself a circumstance from which
malice may be inferred. We wish, therefore, to reiterate the doctrine
emphatically, that drunkenness is no excuse for crime; and we trust
it will be a long time before the contrary doctrine, which will be so
convenient to criminals and evil disposed persons, will receive the
sanction of this court. This reasoning seems to us both illogical
and incongruous. To constitute murder in the first degree, the act
must, indeed, be done with malice aforethought and that malice
must be actual, not constructive. At common law, if the accused
shoot his neighbor's fowls and by accident kill the owner, he is
guilty of murder, yet he did not intend to murder but to steal.
Such cases are excluded by the statute from the definition of murder in the first degree; but ' where the act is committed deliberately,
with a deadly weapon, and is likely to be attended with dangerous consequences, the malice requisite to murder will be presumed;
for the law infers that the natural and probable effect of any act deliberately done was intended by its actor,' 2 Am. Grim. Law. 944;
and intent for an instant before the blow, is sufficient to constitute malice: Id. 948. It will be admitted that if the respondent
had killed his victim ' by poison or lying in wait,' the act would
have been murder in the first degree, and the fact that he was intoxicated could not have been admitted to excuse or palliate the crime.
Yet it is claimed that if the circumstances show that the murder
was deliberately planned, and executed with fiendish barbarity and
malice, drunkenness may come in to palliate the crime. This, we
think, is making a distinction without a difference. Chief Justice
HORNBLOWER, 2 Am. Grim. Law, § 1108, speaking of the New
Jersey statute, which is like ours, says: 'This statute, in my opinion, does not alter the law of murder in the least respect. What
was murder before its passage is murder now-what is murder now
was murder before that statute was passed. It has only changed
the punishment of murder in certain cases; or rather, it prescribes
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that, in certain specified modes of committing murder, the punishment shall be death, and in all other kinds of murder, the convict
shall be punished by imprisonment.'"
(c) .Intent.-Onthe question whether a person in committing an
act has done so with the intent requisite to constitute it a crime,
evidence of intoxication is held relevant. Thus it has been ruled
in England that a person who was at the time so drunk as not to
know what she was doing could not be convicted of an attempt to
commit suicide :B. v. Atoore, 3 0. & K. 319. Other English cases
recognise this doctrine: B. v. Xonkhouse, 4 Cox 55. In B. v. Afeakin, 7 0. & P. 297, the prisoner was indicted for stabbing with intent to kill. He was proved to have been "something the worse for
liquor," at the time. ALDERSON, B., ch'arged the jury thus: "It is
my duty to tell you that the prisoner's being intoxicated does not
alter the nature of the offence. If a man chooses to get drunk, it
is his own voluntary act; it is very different from a madness which
is not caused by any act of the person.. That voluntary species of
madness which it is in a party's power to abstain from, he must
answer for. However, with regard to the intention, drunkenness
may perhaps be adverted to according to the nature of the instrument used. If a man uses a stick you would not infer a malicious
intent so strongly against him, if drunk, when he made an intemperate use of it, as you would if he had used a, different kind of
weapon; but where .a dangerous instrument is used,'which, if used,
must produce grievous, bodily harm, drunkenness can have no
effect on the consideration of the malicious intent of.the party."
In Beg. v. Cruse, 8 0. & P. 541 (1838), the prisoner and his wife
were tried in 1838, bWfore PATTESON, J., for the murder of a natural child. It appears that they were both drunk at the time.
The judge in charging the jury said: "Although drunkenness is
,no excuse for any crime whatever; yet it is often of very great importance in cases where it is a question of intention. A person may
be so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all and
yet he may be guilty of very great violence. If you are not satisfied that the prisoner, or either of them, had formed a positive
intention of murdering this child, you may still find them guilty
of an assault." The prisoners were convicted of assault.
The American cases are more numerous. In Wood v. State, 34
Ark. 341, 36 Am. Rep. 13, where the crime was larceny, the court
held that if the prisoner was too drunk to entertain a felonious intent
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could not be convicted. State v. Bell, 29 Iowa 316, was a prosecution for breaking and entering a dwelling-house with intent to commit larceny. "The drunkenness," said the Supreme Court "is a
proper circumstance and should be weighed by the jury in determining whether there existed the specific intent to commit the
felony charged. Whether he had the intent charged, whether he
was capable of conceiving it, or whether he was so completelyovercome by his debauch as to be incapable of forming any purpose,
were questions for the jury. If, as claimed by defendant, he
blundered into this house through a drunken mistake, under such
circumstances as to show an entire absence of reason, or such as
would indicate the inability to form any definite purpose, and especially of committing a larceny, then there was no guilt, at least
not the offence here charged. The accused may have been guilty
of a very great fault, but there is in reason and law a very clear
distinction between this and the intentionalinjury or crime contemplated by the statute." In Scott v. State, 12 Tex. App. 31, the
charge- was assault with intent to rob, and it was held that evidence
of drunkenness was relevant on the question of intent. In Roberts
v. People, 19 Mich. 401, the charge was shooting with intent to kill,
and it was laid down that where an offence is an act combined with
an intent to commit an offence not actually committed, if the
prisoner was rendered by intoxication incapable of entertaining the
intent he is not .guilty. The Supreme Courts of Minnesota and
California are divided in the question whether drunkenness can be
urged as an excuse for voting twice at an election-the former holding that it can, the latter that it cannot : State v. Welch, 21 Minn.
22; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678.
A number of cases in other states, support the admission of evidence of drunkenness as to the question of intent: State v. Maxwell,
42 Iowa 208 (1875); Wenz v. State, 1 Tex. App. 86 (1876);
Loza v. State, Id. 488 (1877); U. S. Bowen, 4 Cranch C. C. 604
(1835) ; State y. Schingen, 20 Wis. 74 (1865) ; State v. Collenan,
27 La. Ann. 691 (1875) ; State v. Triva8, 82 Id. 1086 (36 Am.
Rep. 293) (1880); Renslie v. State, 3 Heisk. 202 (1871); State
v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154 (1866). Contra: O'Herrinv. State, 14
Ind. 420 (1860); Dawson v. State, 16 Id. 428 (1861). As to the
relevancy of drunkenness on the question of malice, see Nichols v.
State, 8 Ohio St. 435 (1858); Shannahanv. Com., 8 Bush 468; 8
Am. Rep. 465 (1871).
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(d) Knowledge.-In Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 535, it was held
that on an indictment for passing a counterfeit bill, the drunkenness
of the accused at the time was relevant; and the same ruling was
made in an earlier case in the Federal Court: U. S. v. lloudenbuat,
Baldw. 514.
(e) Threats.-In B. v. Thomas, 7. C. & P. 817, it was said by
PARE, J.: "Where the question is whether words have been uttered with a deliberate purpose or are merely low and idle expressions the drunkenness of the person uttering them is proper to be
considered. .But if there is really a previous determination to resent a slight affront in a barbarous manner the state of drunkenness in which the prisoner was, ought not to be regarded, for
it would furnish no excuse." In a Delaware case, the judge, in
explaining the exception to the rule that evidence of intoxication is
not admissible on the question of the guilt of a crime, said, "The
other is when antecedent threats, menaces or malicious and revengful
expressions are proved to have been uttered by the accused when
drunk or intoxicated, and when it always becomes a legitimate matter for the grave consideration of the jury, whether they are but
the idle and unmeaning declarations and denunciations of an angry
and drunken man merely, or are probably to be regarded as of
graver and more serious and sober import, denoting an actual intent
to do what he threatens; for the law presumes a drunken man to e
capable of conceiving and entertaining even. express malice aforethought and perpetrating with premeditation and design murder in
the first degree under the statute: State v. Hfurley, 1 Houst. Cr.
Cas. 28 (1858). In Bastuiood v. People, 3 Park. 25 (1855), it
was said: "That it was of great importance for the jury to know
whether the prisoner was or was not intoxicated is obvious. It clearly
did not necessarily follow because the prisoner used !he expressions
which I have referred to that he really entertained the design which
the words import. It, not unfrequently happens, that when men
are wrought up to a pitch of frenzied excitement by intoxication or
by passion their language assumes a degree of violence far beyond
any deliberate purpose which they have formed. Instances of this
kind must have come under the observation of every man of experience."
(f) Provocation.-InR. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817, PARK, J.,
said to the jury: " I must also tell you that if a man makes himself voluntarily drunk,that it is no excuse for any crime he may corn-
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mit whilst he is so; he must take the consequences of his own
voluntary act, or most crimes would: otherwise be unpunished. But
drunkenness may be taken into consideration in cases where what
the law deems sufficient provocation has been given, because the
quesion is, in such cases, whether the fatal act is to be attributed
to the passion of anger excited by the previous provocation, and
that passion is more easily excitable in a person -when in a state of
intoxication than when he is sober," and this is the law in the
United States: State v. Burley, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 28 (1858);
Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 607 (1860); State v. lCeants, 1 Spears
384.
(g) elf Defence.-In Afarshalrs Case, Lewin 76, tried before
PARK, J., in the year 1830, on an indictment for stabbing, the
judge told the jury that they might take into consideration, the
fact of the person being drunk at the time in order to determine
whether he acted under a bona fide apprehension that his person
or property was about to be attacked.
In Goodier's Case, York Summer Assizes 1831, PARK, J.,
directed the jury to the same effect.
In Beg. v. Gamlen, 1 F. & F. 90 (1858), the prisoner was
indicted for assault. The charge arose out of an affray at a fair, and
there was ground for supposing that he acted under apprehension
of an assault upon himself. All concerned were drunk. CROWDER,
J., charged the jury that, ":Drunkenness is no excuse for crime, but
in considering whether the prisoner apprehended an assault on
himself, you may take into account the state in which he was." He
was acquitted. But consult Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 (1853).
(h)Involuntary J'ntoxicaton.-The last exception requires no
argument. A person who had been made drunk by the fraud or
artifice of another would not be punishable for a crime committed
while in that state, if his condition was such as to render him not
criminally liable had his mental state been caused by disease:
Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 605.
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